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COMMENT
You Wouldn't Give Me Anything, Would You?
Tort Liability for Genital Herpes
INTRODUCTION
An estimated ten to twenty million Americans suffer from the
incurable, highly contagious disease known as genital herpes.'
People who have herpes are spreading it accidentally and inten-
tionally at an epidemic rate.2 Genital herpes has been linked to
birth defects, 3 cervical cancer,4 urinary complications, 5 and vary-
ing degrees of psychological and emotional distress.6
There is a dearth of case law concerning civil liability for trans-
1. The Scarlet Letter, TIME, Aug. 2, 1982, at 62 [hereinafter cited as Scarlet Let-
ter]; Herpes: How Common? How Dangerous? Can It Be Cured?, U.S. NEWS AND
WORLD REPORT, Aug. 2, 1982, at 61.
2. There are an estimated 200,000 to 500,000 new cases of genital herpes each
year. Scarlet Letter, supra note 1, at 62. The estimated number and rate of consulta-
tions with physicians for genital herpes infections increased markedly from 1966 to
1979. The rate at which patients consulted fee-for-service, office-based physicians for
genital herpes infections increased almost nine-fold from 3.4 per 100,000 consulta-
tions in 1966 to 29.2 per 100,000 in 1979. Genital Herpes Infection-United States,
1966-1979, 31 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 137 (1982).
3. The overall risk of neonatal herpes has been estimated to be about ten per
cent in infants born to mothers with symptomatic genital herpes after thirty-two
weeks of gestation, and about fifty percent if the virus is present at delivery. The
overall mortality rate in neonatal herpes is sixty to seventy percent, and fewer than
twenty percent of patients survive without significant complications. These complica-
tions include severe infection of the infants liver, adrenal glands, lungs, brain, and
other organs. One half of these infants have clinical evidence of central nervous sys-
tem involvement. Oxman, GenitalHerpes, in MEDICAL AND MICROBIOLOGY AND IN-
FFCTIous DISEASE 1218, 1223 (Braude ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Oxman].
4. Evidence has linked genital herpes infection with cancer of the cervix. Can-
cer of the cervix is more frequent in women of lower socioeconomic classes. The
occurrence of this cancer is low in celibate women and increased in women who have
intercourse at an early age and multiple sex partners. Also, the herpes virus is more
common in patients with cancer of the cervix in comparison to control groups. Geni-
tal herpes is acquired in the second and third decades of women, and cancer of the
cervix appears in the forth and fifth decades.
These observations are consistent with the hypothesis that genital herpes may initi-
ate a process that results in cancer following a latent period of several years. At pres-
ent, it cannot be stated with certainty whether genital herpes causes cervical cancer.
However, the association appears valid. R. NOBLE, Genital Herpes Virus Infections, in
SEXUALLY TRANSMITrED DISEASES: GUIDE TO DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 69, 75 (2d
ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as NOBLE].
5. Id.
6. The feelings range from hatred of the opposite gender to shame and feeling
like a leper. See generally Scarlet Letter, supra note 1, at 63, 64; You Wouldn't Give
Me Anything, Would You?, THE WASHINGTONIAN, Sept. 1982, at 175 [hereinafter
cited as Give Me Anything?]; Herpes Simplex II Incurable Venereal Disease Epidemic
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mission of venereal disease. In addition, the medical and social
nature of genital herpes creates a new situation. Unlike other
common venereal diseases, such as syphilis and gonorrhea, genital
herpes is an incurable virus.7 Genital herpes knows no social
boundaries and is prevalent even among the most affluent classes
of American society.8 Because of the recent outspokenness of
those suffering from genital herpes,9 and public awareness con-
cerning the disease, the social stigma attached to revealing one's
self as infected has diminished.' 0 These factors combine to make
legal actions seeking redress for genital herpes inevitable. Several
lawsuits have already been filed.1' These lawsuits transform what
was once merely a social problem into a legal issue as well. Prac-
titioners and the courts will be faced with the question of whether
a person inflicted with genital herpes has a valid legal cause of
action, and if so, under what circumstances.
This Comment will discuss whether the courts should find a le-
Threatens Blacks of all Classes, EBONY, June 1981, at 41, 43 [hereinafter cited as
Simplex II].
7. See generally Oxman, supra note 3. Syphilis and gonnorhea are bacterial
and, if detected, can usually be cured with antibiotics such as penicillin. The fact that
they are curable bacterial sexually transmitted diseases makes them quite distinct
from genital herpes. Jedson, Sexually Transmitted Diseases: How Shifting Patterns
WillAffect Your Practice, Moo. MEO., Oct. 1982, at 62.
8. Genital herpes is not a disease confined to the lower socioeconomic classes of
America. A Time magazine article relates the laments of infected attorneys, a psy-
chotherapist, a real estate salesman and a university professor. Scarlet Letter, supra
note I, at 62-66.
9. Id. at 66.
10. Group therapy sessions, television and radio talk shows, and the print media
are addressing the issue nationwide. See generally Scarlet Letter, supra note 1; Sim-
plex I, supra note 6; Give Me Anything?, supra note 6.
11. See, e.g., Liptrot v. Basini, No. 82-19427 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Broward County filed
Sept. 1982). Plaintiff Susan Liptrot has sued defendant Basini for $5,000 compensa-
tory, and $100,000 punitive damages for fraudulently concealing his genital herpes
infection from her, causing her to contract the disease. Liptrot alleges that defendant
Basini knew he had genital herpes, but fraudulently represented to her that he did not
have any sexually communicable diseases. Plaintiff claims to have relied on defend-
ants false claim, and engaged in sexual intercourse. She claims to have noticed a sore
on defendants genitals the next day, and to have contracted genital herpes two days
later. See also Olson v. Olson, No. 567066-6 (Cal. Super. Ct., Alameda County filed
Dec. 21, 1982). Plaintiff Marietta Olson has sued her husband Rex Lee Olson for
compensatory and punitive damages alleging negligence, battery, and fraud, for the
transmission of genital herpes. The complaint is form pleaded and exposes no other
facts. See also St. Clair v. St. Clair, No. DR82-3962 (Mo. Cir. Ct., Jackson County
filed Dec. 27, 1982). Plaintiff Joanne N. St. Clair has sued her husband J. Wesley St.
Clair for $1,500,000 in conjunction with a divorce action, for causing her to be ex-
posed or infected for a lifetime with herpes. More of these cases are scheduled to
come to trial before publication. On January 3, 1984 in Ottumwa, Iowa, a 68 year-old
woman received a default judgment from her ex-husband for intentionally infecting
her with genital herpes. The damages were compensatory and based on evidence of
physical injury, embarrassment, and humiliation. Mormann v. Mormann, No. CL
2021 (Iowa Dist. Ct., Wapello County filed June 28, 1983). [A copy of each com-
plaint is on file in the offices of California Western Law Review].
3
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gal duty to warn or take preventative measures to prevent the
spread of genital herpes. After summarizing the medical back-
ground, the Comment will shift its focus to an analysis of possible
theories of tort liability available to the injured plaintiff. Specifi-
cally, this Comment will examine causes of action in negligence,
battery, and fraud. After a brief survey of possible affirmative
defenses, it will be concluded that analogous case law concerning
contagious diseases, common law tort theory, and public concern
over the spread of genital herpes mandate the recognition of a
legally enforceable duty.
I. MEDICAL BACKGROUND
The existence of the herpes virus has been known for more than
two thousand years.12 In its genital form, herpes is an acute in-
flammatory herpes simplex virus infection of the sexual organs. 13
It is transmitted through sexual contact with a herpes carrier. 14
The incubation period after contact is generally from two to seven
days.15 Genital herpes in the female causes painful vesicles and
ulcers of the vulva and vagina, which may extend to the buttocks
and thigh areas.16 The cervix is also usually infected and there is
often a profuse watery vaginal discharge. 17 In the male, the le-
sions of genital herpes are similar to those of the female, but ap-
pear on and around the penis, and on the buttocks and thighs. 18
In both males and females the primary infection usually includes
urinary retention, sometimes requiring catheterization.' 9 These
12. It is said that herpes caused such a terrible epidemic in Rome that the Em-
peror Tiberious banned kissing. In eighteenth century France, genital herpes was so
common among prostitutes that it was termed a vocational disease of women. Yet it
was not until the 1940's that herpes was found to be a virus, and not until the late
1960's that researchers isolated two types of herpes. Scarlet Letter, supra note 1, at 62;
Oxman, supra note 3, at 1218.
13. Scarlet Letter, supra note I, at 62; Oxman, supra note 3, at 1218. Genital
herpes is only one of the herpes simplex viruses. Herpes simplex infections are most
commonly referred to as fever blisters or chancre sores. This Comment deals only
with the sexually transmitted, or genital herpes, generally referred to medically as
Herpes Simplex II. Herpes Simplex I can be transmitted to the genital area through
oral sex.
14. Although experiments have kept the herpes virus alive up to seventy-two
hours on an inanimate surface, such as a toilet seat, this manner of transmission is not
considered a reasonable risk. See Give Me Anything?, supra note 6, at 176; see also
Scarlet Letter, supra note 1, at 66.
15. Oxman, supra note 3, at 1219.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1220.
19. A catheter is a rubber tube inserted through the urethra to drain the bladder.
DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 230 (26th ed. 1981). See Harris,
Herpes Genitalis, in RECENT ADVANCES IN SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 261,
263 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Harris].
[Vol. 20
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symptoms are often accompanied by fever, headaches, and gen-
eral malaise.20
The primary infection symptoms and pain generally last from
ten to fourteen days, with healing of the lesions in three to five
weeks.2 1 Once the virus has infected the body, "it's your virus for
life."22 When latent, genital herpes recedes to the sacral ganglia
near the base of the spine.23 In the subsequent attacks the symp-
toms recur with varying frequency and intensity,24 but usually
subside within approximately a week.
The virus can be asymptomatic25 in both men and women. The
risk of transmission when the virus is not manifested is un-
known.26 Some experts estimate the chance of asymptomatic
transmission as low as one in one hundred, 27 while others estimate
a much greater risk.28 When left untreated, the virus can lead to a
myriad of complications including; infant deaths,29 blindness, 30 le-
sions on the hand and face,3' and many emotional and psycholog-
ical problems.32
20. Oxman, supra note 3, at 1220.
21. Id.
22. Battling An Elusive Invader, TIME, Aug. 2, 1982, at 68. "What makes it
unique is that unlike influenza and other viruses, it [genital herpes] survives in the
human body long after an attack has subsided." Id.
23. The virus withdraws to the sacral ganglia nerve cells, which are beyond the
bodies immune system. As a result, the virus is beyond the reach of the immune
system and enters a latent stage. Id. The sacral ganglia is a mass of nerve cells lo-
cated near the base of the spine. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY
538 (26th ed. 1981).
24. Some persons suffer more than one attack a month, while others may go
years without a recurrence. Certain situations are said to be associated with recur-
rences. Among these are stress, sexual activity, and fever. Recurrences generally take
place at the same site, and in some instances, multiple lesions may be present. No-
BLE, supra note 4, at 74.
25. Asymptomatic means without subjective evidence of the disease.
26. NOBLE, supra note 4, at 73; see also Oxman, supra note 3, at 1223.
27. Give Me Anything?, supra note 6, at 176.
28. See San Diego Union, Oct. 15, 1982, § A, at 25, col. I (predicting possibility
to be as high as thirty percent of the time). But see, Corey, The National History of
GenitalHSV, THE HELPER, March 1982, at 2 ("probability appears small") [hereinaf-
ter cited as Corey]. (The Helper is available through the American Social Health
Association in Palo Alto, California); see also NOBLE, supra note 4, at 75 (stating
patients are thought to be non-infectious when the sores have healed).
29. Oxman, supra note 3, at 1223 (indicating infant deaths occur in about fifty
percent of child births when a child passes through an infected birth canal).
30. Touching an infected area and transmitting the virus to the eye can result in
damage or blindness. Ocular Herpes is the most common cause of infectious blind-
ness in the United States. See Blough, HSVin the Eye, THE HELPER, March 1982, at
5 (describing ocular herpes).
31. Herpes labitis and stomatitus. See Oxman, Herpes Stomatitus, in MEDICAL
AND MICROBIOLOrY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASE 860, 868 (Braude ed. 1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Oxman II] (the herpes virus may be spread by touching the active virus
and then the mucous membrane of the eye or mouth).
32. See Oxman, supra note 3; Scarlet Letter, supra note 1; Harris, supra note 19.
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The severity of the consequences of herpes infection gives rise
to a serious legal question: How can a victim of this virus obtain
redress for the physical, emotional, and psychological harm
caused by the transmitter? Morally, it seems liability should flow
freely from the transmitter to the victim. 33 However, ours is a so-
ciety of laws, and tort liability for genital herpes has yet to be
tested by the courts.34
II. THEORIES OF TORT LIABILITY
A. Negligence
Negligence is a broad, convenient term employed to label con-
duct beneath the standard insisted on by society.35 However, the
negligence case is governed by more specific rules. The elements
necessary for a cause of action in negligence are: (1) a duty of
care on the part of the defendant, (2) a breach of that duty,
(3) cause in fact and proximate cause, and (4) actual loss or dam-
age.36 Each element will be discussed in the context of one person
transmitting genital herpes to another.
1. Duty. A typical dilemma for a herpetic37 is when, or
whether to, disclose his condition to a potential sex partner. Most
of those referred to and interviewed in recent publications who
knew they had genital herpes recognized a moral and ethical duty
to warn their potential partner of their contagious condition.38
Some, however, felt differently. One sufferer was quoted in a re-
cent Time magazine cover story: "When I first got it, I wanted to
pass it on to everyone for vengeance until everyone had it and it
became normal." 39 Time also reported a midwestern woman who
claims to have infected seventy-five men in three years and a Phil-
33. See How, Where, When, and "at... to tell a sex partner about genital
herpes, THE HELPER, June 1981, at 1, 2 (the periodical discusses the do's and don't's
of informing a potential sex partner of the virus. For example, on the issue of telling
a partner about herpes, the publication concludes that honesty and openness has been
the best policy) [hereinafter cited as How, Where, When]. •
34. There are no reported appellate decisions. But see supra note 11 (cited cases
are pending actions).
35. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § l(i) (1966). See, e.g., Watenpaugh v. L.L. Coryell &
Sons, 135 Neb. 607, 611, 283 N.W. 204, 206 (1939).
36. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 143 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinaf-
ter cited as PROSSER ON TORTS].
37. "Herpetic" refers to one who has herpes. How, Where, When, supra note 33,
at 2. In the context of this Comment herpetic refers only to those who have genital
herpes.
38. See Scarlet Letter, supra note 1; see also How, Where, When, supra note 33, at
1, 2. (The results of a survey of persons infected with herpes concerning the disclo-
sure dilemma indicate the consensus was, "Never tell an untruth about herpes." The
authors further state, "The overwhelming opinion was that all people have the right
to know what they are getting into before they are in the midst of it.")
39. Scarlet Letter, supra note 1, at 64.
[Vol. 20
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adelphia man who brags of infecting twenty women.40
Since genital herpes is caused by sexual contact, 41 the moral
duty of a herpetic would seem to be either to abstain from sex or
to disclose the condition to a potential sex partner.42 The courts
have yet to decide whether this moral duty is also a legal duty.
Whether a person owes a legal duty to another is the essential
question in negligence-whether the plaintiffs interests are enti-
tled to legal protection from the defendant's conduct.43 However,
it should be recognized the term duty is not sacrosanct in itself. It
is only an expression of the total of those considerations of policy
which have led the law to say that a particular plaintiff is entitled
to relief.44
The principle policy considerations in determining duty are:
... the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suf-
fered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the
policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to
the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing
a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and
the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk
involved.45
In weighing these policy considerations, the primary considera-
tion in determining whether a new duty should be imposed upon a
defendant is "the extent of the burden to the defendant and conse-
quences to the community of imposing a duty . -46 The
courts have recognized a legal duty to warn of possible infection
from other contagious disease in several relationships. These in-
clude husband and wife,47 doctors and those who are likely to
have contact with a diseased patient,48 hospitals and patients who
40. Id.
41. See Oxman, supra note 3, at 1219. Although the virus may remain alive on
an inanimate object, the chance of transmission without sexual contact is not reason-
ably possible. The virus must come into direct contact with a mucous membrane or
cut, and there must be sufficient concentration of the virus. See also Give Me Any-
thing?, supra note 6, at 176 (denying the myth of transmission from toilet seats or
towels).
42. See generally How, Where, When, supra note 33, at 1, 2 (discussing the disclo-
sure dilemma).
43. Derrick v. Ontario Community Hosp., 47 Cal. App. 3d 145, 152, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 566, 571 (Ct. App. 1975); see also PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 36, at 325-26.
44. See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 36, at 332-33.
45. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 113, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr.
97, 100 (1968).
46. Id.; see also Coulter v. Superior Ct., 21 Cal. 3d 144, 153, 577 P.2d 669, 674,
145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 539 (1978).
47. Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920) (husband gave wife
venereal disease).
48. See, e.g., Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970)
1983]
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may come into contact with other diseased patients, 49 landlord
and tenant,50 and employer and employee.5'
In the 1920 case Crowell v. Crowel, 52 a woman successfully
sued her husband for "wrongfully and recklessly" infecting her
with a "loathsome" venereal disease.53 In Crowell, the defendant
husband had contracted a venereal disease extramaritally, con-
cealed the fact, and transmitted it to his wife. In affirming a ten
thousand dollar judgment, which included punitive damages, the
North Carolina Supreme Court stated "[I]t is a well-settled propo-
sition of law that a person is liable if he negligently exposes an-
other to a contagious or infectious disease. ' 54
Although the complaint in Crowell alleged negligence, fraud,
and assault, the court stated the defendant would have been liable
in negligence, independent of the assault or fraudulent conceal-
ment.5 5 In finding the defendant had breached his duty, the Crow-
ell court relied heavily on the marital relationship, and especially
on the fact that the wife was virtuous56 and the husband candidly
adulterous.5 7 Other courts in this period denied liability for infec-
tion of venereal disease from husband to wife because of inter-
spousal immunity,58 and the doctrine of in pari delicto59 neither of
(tuberculosis); Jones v. Stanko, 118 Ohio St. 147, 160 N.E. 456 (1928) (smallpox);
Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 500 P.2d 880, 103 Cal. Rptr. 856(1972) (salmonella); Derrick v. Ontario Community Hosp., 47 Cal. App. 3d 145, 120
Cal. Rptr. 566 (Ct. App. 1975).
49. Capelouto v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 7 Cal. 3d 889, 500 P.2d 880, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 856 (1972); Derrick v. Ontario Community Hosp., 47 Cal. App. 3d 145, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 566 (Ct. App. 1975).
50. Earle v. Kulko, 26 NJ. Super. 471, 98 A.2d 107 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953)
(landlord knew a tenant had tuberculosis and failed to warn other tenants).
51. Crim v. International Harvester Co., 646 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1981). In Crim,
an employer failed to warn employees of the danger from "valley fever." "Valley
fever" is a lung disease contracted from the dust in the Southwest. The plaintiff, an
auto dealer, was invited to defendant's Arizona test track to test drive new vehicles.
Plaintiff contracted the disease while on the trip. Id. at 162.
52. 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920).
53. Id. at 517, 105 S.E. at 207.
54. Id. at 518, 105 S.E. at 208 (quoting Skilling v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173
N.W. 663 (1919)).
55. Crowell, 180 N.C. at 518, 105 S.E. at 208.
56. For example, Judge Lane in Crowell stated, in reference to the woman's
subordinate role in the marital relationship, "The origin of such treatment was per-
haps natural in the economic conditions of a barbarous age when superior physical
force made the wife the slave of the husband. But those conditions have passed ...
Wives are no longer chattels." Id. at 520, 105 S.E. at, 210.
57. Id. at 518, 105 S.E. at 208.
58. See, e.g., Bandfield v. Bandfield, 117 Mich. 80, 75 N.W. 287 (1898) (venereal
disease); Shultz v. Christopher, 65 Wash. 496, 118 P. 629 (1911) (venereal disease).
59. For an excellent example of chauvinistic judicial side-stepping, see Deeds v.
Strode, 6 Idaho 317, 55 P. 656 (1898). In Deeds, the plaintiff, a woman, had been
separated from her first husband for seven years. She filed for and received a divorce,
which this court later found void for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiff later married de-
8
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which would be applicable today in most jurisdictions.60
The duties and obligations of the marital relationship played a
major role in finding a legal duty in these cases. However, the
principle considerations in finding a legal duty to warn in a geni-
tal herpes suit: foreseeability of harm, moral blame of defendant's
conduct, the extent of the burden to the defendant, and a policy of
preventing future harm would be present regardless of marriage.
Further support for this inference is found in the recent Wyoming
case, Duke v. Housen.61
In Duke, the plaintiff, a female college student, met the defend-
ant on April 4, 1970.62 On the same night and early the next
morning the plaintiff engaged in sexual intercourse with defend-
ant.63 On April 8, plaintiff began a trip by truck with defendant
from New York to Denver, "engaging on and off in acts of sexual
intercourse with defendant along the way." 64 On April 21, 1970,
defendant broke off the relationship with plaintiff, and informed
her for the first time that he had gonorrhea, and that now she
probably had it as well.65 Plaintiff later developed serious compli-
cations and sued the defendant in Wyoming where he resided.66
The trial court awarded plaintiff over one million dollars in
compensatory and punitive damages based on defendant's alleged
grossly negligent infection of plaintiff with venereal disease.67 On
appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court vacated the trial court judg-
ment on the basis of an expired statute of limitation.68 However,
the court did state that plaintiffs claim was within the principle of
fendant. Four years after her marriage to defendant, plaintiff filed for a divorce due
to cruel and inhuman treatment. Defendant had transmitted venereal disease to the
plaintiff. The Deeds court found that since the first marriage was not legally termi-
nated, the second marriage was void, therefore the plaintiffs marriages were illegal,
therefore plaintiff could not recover. Id. at 319-20, 55 P. at 657-58. The doctrine of in
pari delicto has been replaced in tort law with contributory and comparative negli-
gence. See infra notes 176-88 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Hack v. Hack, 433 A.2d 859 (Pa. 1980): "[W]e conclude that inter-
spousal tort immunity is premised upon outmoded theories unsupported by today's
social conditions and public policy and hence has no justification in comtemporary
society." Id. at 868. The following states retain the common law doctrine of inter-
spousal tort immunity: Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming.
The remaining states have either modified or abrogated the old common law rule. Id.
at 869.
61. 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1979).




66. Id. at 339.
67. Id. at 339-40.
68. The court in Duke held that the statute of limitations of the state where the
tort took place, New York, applied. The court found that New York's three year
statute of limitation had expired on April 20, 1973. Duke filed suit on April 19, 1974,
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tort, and that one who negligently exposes another to an infectious
or contagious disease can be held liable for damages. 69
The trial court in Duke found that defendant had breached his
legal duty to warn plaintiff, although no special relationship ex-
isted.70 The Wyoming Supreme Court intimated that but for the
statute of limitations plaintiff had a valid cause of action.71 The
legal duty to warn of a sexually contagious disease that would
have been upheld in Duke, absent the expired statute of limita-
tions, represents an enlightened approach. The burden which a
legal duty to warn would place on the herpetic defendant is mini-
mal when weighed against the potential pain and suffering genital
herpes may cause the plaintiff.72
In some states, statutes provide that knowingly exposing one's
self or another to an infectious disease, or having intercourse
while knowingly infected with a venereal disease are misdemean-
ors.73 When the plaintiff falls within the class of persons the stat-
ute intended to protect, and liability will further the goals of the
regulation, a majority of courts hold that an unexcused violation
would be conclusive on the issue of negligence.74 These statutes
are intended to prevent the spread of venereal and contagious dis-
eases. 75 The plaintiff in a genital herpes suit would be one whom
in Wyoming and was thereby barred from recovery. If the court in Duke had found
Wyoming's four year statute applicable, the filing would have been timely. Id. at 347.
69. Id. at 340.
70. The plaintiff and defendant were merely sex partners. Id. at 338.
71. The Duke court stated: "When considering the statute of limitations, the na-
ture of the injury, its extent, the amount of money damages involved, social consider-
ations, and the emotional appeal the facts may have must pass to the background."
Id. at 340.
72. The legal duty would require no more than three words: "I have herpes."
73. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 3353 (Deering 1982) states:
Except in the case of the removal of an afflicted person in a manner the least
dangerous to the public health, any person afflicted with any contagious,
infectious, or communicable disease who willfully exposes himself, and any
person who willfully exposes another person afflicted with such disease, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2307 (McKinney 1971) states:
Any person who, knowing himself or herself to be infected with an infec-
tious venereal disease, has sexual intercourse with another shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor.
74. See, e.g., Madison v. Deseret Livestock Co., 574 F.2d 1027 (10th Cir. 1978)
(where statute is designed to protect life, limb or property); Barthel v. Illinois Cent.
Gulf R.R. Co., 74 IlM. 2d 213, 384 N.E.2d 323 (1978); see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 285 (1965), PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 36, at 200.
75. See People ex rel. Krohn v. Thomas, 133 Misc. 145, 231 N.Y.S. 271 (Sup. Ct.
1928). Referring to New York's venereal disease statutes, the Krohn court held: the
article was enacted for the "benign purpose of protecting the public against the
ravages of venereal diseases" and it should therefore receive a "liberal interpreta-
tion." Id. at 147, 231 N.Y.S. at 275.
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the statute intended to protect.76 California courts hold that such
a breach of statute creates a presumption of negligence which may
be rebutted by showing adequate cause.77 This presumption
would resolve the issue of a legal duty.
Whether a legal duty will exist in a negligence suit for genital
herpes will depend upon the circumstances of each case.78 The
case law concerning contagious diseases, 79 criminal statutes con-
cerning contagious diseases,80 and public concern over the spread
of genital herpes8' warrant a policy of imposing a legal duty upon
the herpetic to warn potential sex partners or to take preventative
measures to prevent transmission of the virus.8 2
2. Breach of Duty. In the absence of overriding policy consid-
erations such as breach of statute,8 3 or strict liability,8 4 foreseeabil-
ity of risk is of primary importance in establishing duty.85 In
order to show that a defendant in a genital herpes suit breached
his duty, plaintiff must show that defendant knew, or should have
known, of the possibility of transmitting the virus and failed to
warn plaintiff or take preventative measures. If a herpetic was
unaware of his own infection, or transmitted the virus while
asymptomatic and without reason to know of the risk, he could
not have breached his duty to warn. If there is no way of being
aware of the risk, there could be no duty.
The risk of asymptomatic transmission, however, is unlikely.86
A male whose virus is active probably will show some manifesta-
76. The statutes are designed to protect the public from venereal and contagious
diseases. See supra note 73.
77. Satterlee v. Orange Glenn Sch. Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P.2d 279 (1947).
78. The court determines as a matter of law whether defendant owes plaintiff a
duty. The circumstances of each case, the judges values, and degree of activism all
play a role in determining duty. See 3 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW, LIABILITY &
LITIGATION 225-30 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DOOLEY].
79. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 73.
81. See generally Scarlet Letter, supra note 1.
82. Although the determination of the existence of a duty is determined in each
case, guidelines and policy can be helpful to the courts. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.
2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
83. Breach of statute would establish breach of duty. See supra note 74 and ac-
companying text.
84. Strict liability would also eliminate the need to find a duty. Strict liability or
liability without fault has been imposed for certain areas of the law such as dangerous
instrumentalities, ferocious animals, and some products liability. Because of the un-
derlying policy in applying strict liability, abnormally dangerous things and activities,
and the defendant's ability to control the risk and absorb costs, its application to the
genital herpes situation is very unlikely. See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 36, at
492-540.
85. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
86. Corey, supra note 28, at 2 (The amount of virus found while not manifesting
lesions was not thought to be sufficient to transmit the virus).
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tions, such as lesions or tenderness.87 He may not have known the
sores were genital herpes or contagious. However, if he was aware
something was wrong it would be up to the jury to determine
whether he should be held to that knowledge.88 Although women
have been found to harbor an active genital herpes virus asymp-
tomatically, 89 the possibility of transmission absent some manifes-
tation of the sores is unknown.90
The majority of transmissions occur when there is some mani-
festation of the virus.91 However, plaintiffs proof would not be
limited to the presence or absence of lesions at the time of sexual
contact. Any circumstantial evidence, such as a previous diagno-
sis or an admission to another92 could be used to show that de-
fendant was aware, or should have been aware, of the infectious
condition.93 Once the plaintiff has established that the defendant
should have foreseen the risk, breach of duty would be established
by the failure to warn or take preventative measures.
3. Causation. Having established that the defendant breached
his duty, plaintiff must next prove causation.94 The law recog-
nizes two separate categories of causation: cause-in-fact, and
proximate cause or legal cause.95 Cause-in-fact is a question of
fact determining whether defendant's conduct actually caused the
plaintiffs injury.96 Proximate or legal cause is a policy question
of whether the law will extend liability for the conduct to the con-
sequences which have in fact occurred. 97
The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
87. Id.
88. Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1979) (the defendant claimed to have
been cured of gonorrhea at the time of sexual contact with the plaintiff but, the jury
found he should have known of the possibility of transmission and held him liable).
Id. at 339-40. See also PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 36, at 150.
89. Corey, supra note 28, at 2.
90. Oxman, supra note 3, at 1224; NOBLE, supra note 4, at 73.
91. Id.
92. Circumstantial evidence would be as valid as direct evidence in establishing
that defendant knew or should have known of the existence of genital herpes. See
generally Elba Wood Prods., Inc. v. Brackin, 356 So. 2d 119 (Ala. 1978); Ned v. Hertz
Corp., 356 So. 2d 1074 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (causation provable by circumstantial
evidence). See also E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13, at 29 (2nd ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE].
93. For example, the defendant may have complained about the sores to a third
party.
94. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (outlining elements of negligence).
95. See Jackson v. City of San Diego, 121 Cal. App. 3d 579, 175 Cal. Rptr. 395(Ct. App. 1981); Monahan v. Weichert, 82 A.D. 102, 442 N.Y.S. 2d 295 (App. Div.
1981).
96. Morgan v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., 87 Wis. 2d 723, 275 N.W. 2d 660
(1979). See also PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 36, at 237-40.
97. Thropp v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 650 F.2d 817, 821-22 (6th Cir.
1981) (quoting PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 36, at 244).
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that defendant's conduct was the cause of the injury.98 A person
with an active sex life and multiple sex partners may have more
difficulty proving causation than one in a monogamous relation-
ship. The more sexual partners a person has had in the preceding
few weeks, the more potential sources of plaintiffs virus, and pos-
sible defendants.
Due to the medical intricacies of genital herpes infections and
transmissions, plaintiffs will rely heavily on expert medical testi-
mony.99 The medical experts have ruled out non-sexual transmis-
sion and have established the usual incubation period to be from
two to fourteen days. These factors will allow most plaintiffs to
trace back their sexual activities to establish the source of the in-
fection. Methods of discovering the presence of the virus antibo-
dies through blood tests even when not active, will further aid
plaintiff in discovering the origin of the injury.100
Proximate or legal cause is not a question of actual causation. 101
Proximate cause is a flexible concept designed to effectuate varied
policies as to who should be responsible for harm suffered.102 In a
genital herpes suit, once breach of duty and actual causation have
been established, proximate cause will have little impact on a one-
on-one claim. 10 3 However, proximate cause may be an issue
where more than two parties are involved. For example, if A
transmits genital herpes to B who subsequently transmits it to C,
A's act would be an actual cause of C's injury. 0 4 WhetherA's act
was the proximate cause of C's harm is a question of law for the
courts to decide. 05
Prosser suggested that proximate cause when used to limit lia-
bility should be determined by the following factors: (1) causation
in fact, (2) apportionment of damages, (3) liability for unforesee-
able consequences, (4) intervening causes, and (5) shifting respon-
sibility. 0 6 Only the first involves a question of actual cause and
98. See, e.g., Comeaux v. Barksdale, 342 So. 2d 1181 (La. App. Ct. 1977) (reason-
able preponderance of the evidence); National Steel Corp. v. Great Lakes Towing
Co., 574 F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1978) (reasonable certainty); Grant v. Town of Newton,
117 N.H. 159, 370 A.2d 285 (1977) (preponderance of the evidence).
99. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 93, § 13, at 29. (Where the sub-
ject matter is difficult to understand, the courts rely on the opinion of experts).
100. The presence of the herpes antibodies can be determined by a simple blood
test. See Nahmias, Diagnosis of Viral Disease, HOSPrrAL PACrICE, April 1982 at 49,
60 (discussing blood tests for herpes virus).
101. See Reynolds, Limits on Negligence Liability.:- Paisgraf at 50, 32 OKLA L. REv.
63 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Reynolds].
102. Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co., 569 F.2d 754 (3rd Cir. 1977).
103. The liability question would have been answered in establishing a breach of
duty.
104. But forA's transmitting genital herpes to B, C would not have contracted it.
105. PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 36, at 244.
106. Id. at 249-60.
1983]
13
Donnell: You Would't Give Me Anything, Would you?  Tort Liability for Geni
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2016
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
effect.'0 7 The others are intertwined with the question of duty,10 8
and should not be discussed in terms of causation. 0 9 Thus, in
terms of extended liability for the transmission of genital herpes,
the court should consider whether the defendant had a duty to
that plaintiff, for example, A to C. In determining that duty, fore-
seeability would play a dominant role. 10 If A should not have
foreseen B's transmitting genital herpes to C, B's act would be a
new tort, or a superceding cause of C's injury."' A's act would
not be the legal cause of C's harm." 2
The ability of courts to limit liability based on foreseeability is
well illustrated by the "open car" cases." 3 The prototype case is
the suit against the defendant who negligently leaves his keys in
the ignition. The car is stolen and the thief injures plaintiff. The
majority of courts hold that although the defendant was negligent
and should have foreseen the theft, defendant could not have fore-
seen that the thief would negligently harm plaintiff." 4 An
analagous situation arises with genital herpes. A should foresee
that B will have sexual contact with someone else after con-
tracting genital herpes fromA. However, A should not be held to
foresee B's negligent transmission of genital herpes to another. If
the courts follow this reasoning liability will be limited to that per-
son to whom defendant actually transmitted the genital herpes.
4. Injury. The final element of plaintiffs prima facie case in
negligence is injury. 15 Plaintiff must prove that he has suffered
some loss or damage." 6 The physical injury suffered by those
who have genital herpes will differ in degree and duration for
each individual." 7 Some may encounter mild discomfort with in-
107. See id. at 250.
108. Id. at 224-25.
109. Id. at 249-50.
110. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
111. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines superceding cause as follows:
A superceding cause is an act of a third person or other force which by its
intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which
his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 441 (1965).
112. See generally, Michael v. United States, 338 F.2d 219 (6th Cir. 1964); Sturm
v. Green, 398 P.2d 799 (Okla. 1965); Felty v. General Tel. Co. of Illinois, 47 111. App.
3d 427, 362 N.E.2d 43 (1977).
113. See Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 66, 271 P.2d 23, 27 (1954) (risk of theft
was foreseeable, but that thief would be negligent was not). See also Danne, Liability
of Motorist Who Left Key In Ignition For Damage or Injury Caused by Stranger Oper-
ating the Vehicle, Annot., 45 A.L.R. 3d 787 (1972).
114. See supra note 113.
115. See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 36, at 143.
116. Negligence actions may not be maintained unless one has suffered injury or
damage. Cannon v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 374 Mass. 739, 374 N.E.2d 582 (1978).
117. See Oxman, supra note 3, at 1224; NOBLE, supra note 4, at 76; Scarlet Letter,
supra note 1, at 64.
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frequent recurring attacks,118 others may suffer painful fluid filled
clusters accompanied by fever and general malaise as often as
twice a month.' 19 Many suffer serious psychological as well as
physical harm.120
For most herpetics, the emotional trauma far outweighs the
physical discomfort. 121 "Herpes has cost me thousands of dollars,
the loss of two wives (and children), and great emotional and
mental distress. I am presently unemployed, indirectly because of
herpes. It has effectively destroyed my life."' 22 Time magazine
reported that herpetics go through states similar to those mourn-
ing the loss of a loved one. These feelings include, "shock, emo-
tional numbing, isolation and loneliness, sometimes serious
depression and impotence."'123 For the genital herpes plaintiff
there will always be some physical injury,124 therefore the emo-
tional distress will be parasitic, and if proven can be compensated
as an injury. 25
B. Intentional Torts
If plaintiff can establish that defendant acted intentionally he
may want to pursue a cause of action in battery or fraud. The
intent required in a genital herpes suit is not only the intent to
transfer the disease, it may also be the intent to cause the contact
which causes the disease. 26 When defendant knows he has geni-
tal herpes and knows that the probability of transmitting it is
118. Id.
119. See Oxman, supra note 3, at 1220-21; see also Scarlet Letter, supra note 1.
The injury ranges from mild discomfort to incapacity. For example, "A Washington
lawyer, 28, spent a month in bed with her first bout, then stayed drunk for half a
year. . . ." Scarlet Letter, supra note 1, at 64.
120. "I felt as though someone pulled the plug ... and let all my sexuality and
self-confidence swirl down the drain." Scarlet Letter, supra note 1, at 64 (quoting
twenty-eight year old female attorney).
121. "A lot of time I couldn't be sexual. . . . She saw it as a way of rejecting her.
I withdrew emotionally and she didn't understand. Finally she moved out. I felt
guilty, asexual." Scarlet Letter, supra note 1, at 64 (quoting Michael Herships on his
recurrent monthly attacks).
122. Simplex II, supra, note 6, at 42 (quoting from a male herpetic): "I think of
myself as a bright, confident, forthright person, successful at most things I do. How-
ever, herpes is the tragedy, thus far, of my life. I feel a deep psychological trauma
about it. I feel loathsome, worthless and untouchable as a sexual partner-and to a
large degree, social partner." Id. at 42 (quoting a New York woman).
123. Scarlet Letter, supra note 1, at 64. Note that these comments were not made
in anticipation of monetary restitution.
124. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
125. See generally O'Donnell v. United States, 428 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. La. 1977)
(recovery allowed for possible failure of marriage prospects due to personality
changes); Karle v. National Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 448 F. Supp. 753 (W.D. Pa.
1978) (scarring and embarrassment); Armstead v. James, 220 Va. 171, 257 S.E.2d 767
(1979) (humiliation due to deformity).
126. Schroeder v. Auto Driveway Co., I1 Cal. 3d 908, 523 P.2d 662, 114 Cal. Rptr.
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great, the act of sex which results in the contraction of genital
herpes may constitute an intentional tort.127
1. Battery. The elements necessary to prove a civil battery
are: (1) intent, (2) contact, and (3) offensive contact.' 2 In the
1917 case of State v. Lankford,129 Lankford was found guilty of
criminal assault and battery for transmitting syphilis to his wife.
The court in Lankford held:
A wife in confiding her person to her husband does not consent
to cruel treatment, or to infection with a loathsome disease. A
husband, therefore, knowing that he has such a disease and
concealing the fact from his wife, by accepting her consent, and
communicating the infection to her, inflicts on her physical
abuse, and injury, resulting in great bodily harm; and he be-
comes, notwithstanding his marital rights, guilty of an assault,
and indeed, a completed battery.' 30
The court went on to state, "If the accused knew he was infected
with syphilis, and his infection was unknown to his wife, the in-
tent to communicate the disease to her by having sexual inter-
course with her, may be inferred from the actual results."'131
Although Lankford was a criminal prosecution for battery, the
standards for civil and criminal battery are essentially the same. 132
The factual situation in Lankford would satisfy the required ele-
ments of a civil battery action.133 The jury found the requisite
intent, and offensive contact.134 If plaintiff in a genital herpes suit
can show that defendant knew he had the disease at the time of
sexual contact, Lankford provides a persuasive argument for re-
covery through battery.
2. Fraud. A plaintiff who justifiably relies on the misrepre-
sentation of a defendant who claims to be free of genital herpes, or
knowingly withholds that information, may bring a suit in
fraud. 35 The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are: (1) a
622 (1974); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8a (1965); PROSSER ON
TORTS, supra note 36, at 31-32.
127. "If the manifest probability of harm is very great, and the harm follows, we
say that it is done maliciously or intentionally; if not so great, but still considerable,
we say that the harm is done negligently; if there is no apparent danger, we call it
mischance." Holmes, Priilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. I (1894).
128. DOOLEY, supra note 78, at 200.
129. 29 Del. (6 Boyce) 594, 102 A. 63 (1917).
130. Id. at 594, 102 A. at 64.
131. Id.
132. Criminal battery has been defined as an unlawful unconsented to application
of force. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 107 (1969). Civil battery is an unconsented to
touching. 6A CJ.S.Assault and Battery § 7 (1975).
133. See State v. Lankford, 29 Del. (6 Boyce) 594, 102 A. 63 (1917). The elements
are intent, contact, and offensive contact.
134. Id.
135. See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 36, at 685.
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representation known by defendant to be false, (2) made for the
purpose of inducing plaintiff to act in reliance thereon, (3) which
plaintiff does rely on, and (4) acts to his injury. 136 Because of the
defendant's intent to deceive, the plaintiff may not be barred by
his own negligence. 137 Thus, if plaintiff reasonably relied on de-
fendant's misrepresentation the defense of contributory negligence
may not apply.138 However, if the reliance was not justified the
plaintiff would be held to have assumed the risk.139
In a genital herpes suit, nondisclosure by the defendant which
resulted in plaintiff contracting the disease could be brought
under negligence or fraud. If the plaintiff chose fraud, he must
show that the defendant actually knew of his infectious condition
and withheld that information with the purpose of inducing plain-
tiff to have sex. 14 In negligence, plaintiff would only have to
show that defendant knew, or should have known, of the infec-
tious condition and failed to warn.141
If the defendant lied to the plaintiff, claiming that he did not
have genital herpes and plaintiff consented to sex on the basis of
that claim, the plaintiff may sue in fraud.142 Again, the plaintiff
must show that the defendant actually knew he was infected and
made the statement with the intent of inducing plaintiff to have
sex.14
3
In Crowell v. Crowell,144 the plaintiff claimed that the defendant
knew he was infected, knew of the infectious nature of his disease,
concealed such knowledge from plaintiff, and infected her. 45 The
Crowell court found such concealment was a sufficient tort to jus-
tify both compensatory and punitive damages. 146
Because fraud is an intentional tort,147 the plaintiff may be able
136. Kidd v. Kidd, 143 Ind. App. 648, 650, 242 N.E.2d 385, 387 (Ct. App. 1968);
Poliakoff v. National Emblem Ins. Co., 249 So. 2d 477, 478 (Fla. App. Ct. 1971); see
also PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 36, at 685-86.
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 545A comment b (1965).
138. "He is in other words not required to exercise the care of the reasonable man
for his own protection." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 545A comment a
(1965).
139. Id. at comment b. The reliance could not be justified in a genital herpes suit
if the plaintiff knew defendant had herpes.
140. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (discussing elements of battery).
141. See supra notes 36-44 and accompanying text (discussing duty and elements
of negligence). Of course the plaintiff would plead both and rely on negligence if
unable to show actual knowledge and intent.
142. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
143. Defendant's knowledge would be necessary to infer the intent. See supra
notes 128-29.
144. 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920).
145. Id. at 518, 105 S.E. at 208.
146. Id.
147. See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 36, at 385.
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to recover punitive damages. 148 The difficulty in maintaining a
fraud cause of action is proving the defendant had actual knowl-
edge of the disease and made the misrepresentation with the pur-
pose of inducing plaintiff to have sex. 149 However, if the plaintiff
can show actual knowledge, the intent may be inferred by the
jury.150
The plaintiffs decision to sue under negligence, or the inten-
tional torts of battery or fraud should depend upon the defend-
ant's subjective knowledge. If plaintiff cannot show that the
defendant actually knew he had genital herpes, but that he should
have known, plaintiff should sue in negligence. If plaintiff can
show that defendant knew he had the disease, plaintiff can sue in
battery or fraud.
III. REMEDY
Compensatory damages awarded in negligence cases are aimed
at returning the victim, as much as possible, to his condition prior
to the injury.151 If sufficiently proved, the victim of an uninten-
tional tort may have three paths of recovery: loss of earnings and
diminution of earning capacity, medical and other expenses, and
mental pain and suffering. 152 Each may occur in the future as
well as in the past, but all must be proved at the time of trial.15 3
A herpetic will experience the first symptoms of the disease
within a few weeks of the sexual contact with the carrier.154 The
statute of limitation for a personal injury cause of action varies
from state to state. 155 Because of the potential for future damages
this limitation of time in which to show damages may present
problems for the herpetic plaintiff.
In California, a plaintiff will have one year from the first injury
148. See, e.g., Frick v. Abell, 198 Colo. 508, 602 P.2d 852 (1979) (police officers
beat plaintiffs); Banks v. Dawkins, 339 So. 2d 566 (Miss. 1976) (punitive damages are
allowed where defendant knowingly shot plaintiff); see also Punitive or Exemplary
Damagesfor Assault, Annot., 123 A.L.R. 1115 (1939).
149. This would require an admission or diagnosis of defendant's infection to
prove subjective knowledge.
150. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (jury inferred intent to transmit
syphilis).
151. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); see also, D. DOBBS,
REMEDIES 540 (1973) [hereinafter cited as DOBBS].
152. If defendant's conduct is sufficiently "outrageous", punitive damages may be
awarded in negligence, see infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text (discussing pu-
nitive damages in negligence).
153. See DOBBS, supra note 151, at 540.
154. See Oxman, supra note 3, at 1220; NOBLE, supra note 4, at 73.
155. California and New York have one-year statutes of limitations on actions for
personal injury. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340 (Deering's 1973); N.Y. CIVIL PRoc.
LAW § 214 (McKinney 1977).
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in which to file a complaint. 156 Because of the unpredictable re-
current nature of herpes, the plaintiff will not fully know the po-
tential future loss at that time. For example, a female herpetic
may know that the mortality rate for infants born to actively
herpetic mothers is about fifty percent if expensive special precau-
tions are not taken.157 She will not know, however, if she will
have an active case near the time of birth. The defendant would
argue that such future loss is purely conjectural, and should not be
compensated.158
Even though the actual complications may be impossible to pre-
dict, anxiety about the future course of an injury, such as worry
about whether a dog bite will lead to rabies 59 or a burn to can-
cer,160 is a recognized element of pain and suffering. A California
appellate court decision, Coover v. Painless Parker Dentist,161 al-
lowed damages to the victim of x-ray burns for the potential in-
crease of cancer over the objections of defendant that the damages
were conjectural and uncertain. 62 The Coover court stated the
necessity of constantly watching and guarding against cancer was
an obligation and a burden that the defendant had no right to
inflict upon the plaintiff. 63 The genital herpes plaintiff, whose
incurable disease causes constant worry over future outbreaks and
possible complications, certainly has an analogous argument. In
fact, anxiety over possible future complications such as birth de-
fects, lost relationships, and embarrassment may be the most dam-
aging aspect of genital herpes for many sufferers.1 4
Punitive, or exemplary damages, are aimed at punishing the
wrongdoer and serving as a warning to others.' 65 The plaintiff in
a genital herpes suit for negligence may be awarded punitive dam-
ages if he can show that the defendant acted with malice, or will-
ful disregard for the rights of the plaintiff.1 66 The intent necessary
156. CAL. Clv. PROC. CODE § 340 (Deering's 1973).
157. The precautions involve close monitoring through pap smears and vaginal
inspections, and a possible caesarean section to avoid the infected birth canal. See
Oxman, supra note 3, at 1223.
158. The jury may not award damages based on mere speculation. Although
there cannot be mathematical precision, the jury must have a reasonable basis of
computation. See Petrovich v. United States, 421 F.2d 1364 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Eshkenazi
v. Las Fabricas, Inc., 360 So. 2d 430 (Fla. App. Ct. 1978) (fact of damage must be
beyond speculation).
159. Ayers v. Macoughtry, 29 Okla. 399, 117 P.2d 1088 (1911).
160. Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S. 2d 996 (1958).
161. 105 Cal. App. 110, 286 P.2d 1048 (Ct. App. 1930).
162. Id. at 115, 286 P.2d at 1053.
163. Id.
164. See Scarlet Letter, supra note 1.
165. Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co. 24 Cal. 3d 773, 598 P.2d 45, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392
(1979); Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1976).
166. The shades of "outrageousness" which a jury should find before awarding
19831
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to show malice does not require that the defendant consciously
intended to transmit genital herpes to the plaintiff. In tort law,
"intended" consequences comprise not only those results the actor
desires but also those which he knows, or should know, are sub-
stantially certain to result from his conduct.167 Even if the plain-
tiff did not actually intend to transmit the disease, malice may be
inferred if he was, or should have been, substantially certain it
would be transmitted. 68
Battery and fraud are by their nature intentional and should
allow instructions for punitive damages. 69 If punitive damages
are allowed the jury may consider defendant's wealth in order to
provide sufficient deterrence or punishment.170 To show that de-
fendant's conduct was sufficiently outrageous to allow punitive
damages in any cause of action for genital herpes, the plaintiff
must show that defendant had actual knowledge of the disease. '71
IV. DEFENSES
A1. Negligence
The common defenses to negligence actions include assumption
of the risk and contributory negligence or reduction of liability
through comparative negligence.' 72 These defenses would be
punitive damages vary with each jurisdiction. See, e.g., Western Decor & Furnish-
ings Indus., Inc. v. Bank of America, 91 Cal. App. 3d 293, 154 Cal. Rptr. 287 (Ct.
App. 1979) (malice in fact); Meyer v. Nottger, 241 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1976) (willful or
reckless disregard of another's rights); Felts v. National Account Sys. Ass'n, Inc., 469
F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (such gross and reckless conduct as to be equivalent to
willfull wrong).
167. Schroeder v. Auto Driveway Co., 11 Cal. 3d 908, 523 P.2d 662, 114 Cal. Rptr.
622 (1974).
168. Id. In Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1979) the trial court awarded one
million dollars in punitive damages to plaintiff who contracted gonorrhea. The jury
inferred the requisite knowledge for awarding punitive damages even though defend-
ant had been treated and claimed to be cured. Duke was vacated on other grounds,
see supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Bryan, 82 Ariz. 143, 309 P.2d 773 (1957); see also Puni-
tive or Exemplary Damages/or Assault, Annot., 123 A.L.R. 1115 (1939) (punitive
damages for battery); Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (Ct.
App. 1976) (where fraud is involved, an instruction on exemplary damages is consid-
ered proper).
170. Michael v. Cole, 122 Ariz. 450, 595 P.2d 995 (1979); Merlo v. Standard Life
and Accident Ins. Co., 59 Cal. App. 3d 5, 130 Cal. Rptr. 416 (Ct. App. 1976); see also,
Admissibility on Defendant'r Behal,' As Matter in Mitigation of Punitive Damages, of
Evidence as to His Lack of Financial Resources, Annot., 79 A.L.R. 3d 1138; RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 908 (1978).
171. A defendant could not manifest malice, or intent to transmit genital herpes if
he did not know he had it.
172. Most states have abolished the rule denying any recovery by the plaintiff who
is guilty of contributory negligence and have replaced it with some form of compara-
tive negligence. McConnell, Comparative Negligence: Coping with the Changes, 1981
TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 526.
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available to the defendant in a genital herpes suit.
For assumption of the risk to apply the plaintiff must under-
stand the risk involved, and undertake it entirely, freely, and vol-
untarily' 73 The plaintiff would be unable to recover if the
defendant could show that plaintiff knew of defendant's genital
herpes but consented to sex nevertheless. 174 This consent may be
express or implied. 75 However, since there probably will be no
conclusive evidence of a knowing consent by the plaintiff 76 the
issue will go to the jury.177 Since juries are notoriously unfavora-
ble to the defense, the percentage of cases in which the plaintiff
has actually been barred from recovery by his assumption of the
risk is quite small.' 78 This could prove harmful to the conscien-
tious defendant who warned the plaintiff, but could not prove
it.1 7
9
The standard applied to the plaintiff in assumption of the risk is
a subjective one.'8 0 Plaintiffs failure to conform to the objective
standard of ordinary care would not be assumption of the risk, but
contributory negligence.' 8 ' If the plaintiff is negligent in not seek-
ing to discover whether his partner has genital herpes his recovery
would be barred in a contributory negligence state and propor-
tionately lessened in a comparative negligence state.' 82 For exam-
ple, suppose A met B at a bar or social event, engaged in sexual
intercourse with B that evening and contracted genital herpes. If
A knew of B's infection, A assumed the risk. If B lied and toldA
there was no infection, A might have a cause of action in fraud.
But ifA did not ask, and B did not warn, it would be a question of
fact whether A was also negligent, thereby reducing or barring
173. McGriffv. McGriff, 26 Ariz. App. 430, 549 P.2d 210 (Ct. App. 1976); see also
PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 36, at 440. In California, the assumption must be
both voluntary and unreasonable under the circumstances. Baker v. Chrysler Corp.,
55 Cal. App. 3d 710, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745 (Ct. App. 1976).
174. For example, if plaintiff saw defendant's sores and recognized them as
herpes, or if defendant told plaintiff of the herpes, there would be no breach of duty;
see supra notes 37-82.
175. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1162 (1956).
176. Unless the consent was preserved mechanically, or more than the litigating
parties were present at the time.
177. See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 36, at 447.
178. Id.
179. However, it could be argued that one who would consent to sex knowing of
the risk involved would not bring suit.
180. Plaintiff must know and volunteer to take the risk. See supra note 174.
181. Ward v. Knapp, 134 Cal. App. 2d 286, 286 P.2d 370 (Ct. App. 1955).
182. In a modified comparative negligence state, the plaintiff would not recover if
his fault was over fifty percent. See, e.g., Avery v. Wadlington, 186 Colo. 158, 526
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recovery.1 83
B. Intentional Torts
The defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the
risk would not apply to the genital herpes suit in battery or fraud.
Contributory negligence is not a defense to intentional torts. 184
Assumption of the risk could not apply to the fraud cause of ac-
tion since the essence of fraud is the plaintiff not knowing of the
risk involved.185 The defendant in a battery suit may argue that
genital herpes is a common consequence of sex, and that the
plaintiff in consenting to sex is assuming the risk of infection. 8 6
C. Statute of Limitations
The remaining affirmative defense for either negligent or inten-
tional infection of genital herpes is the statute of limitations. In
California the plaintiff must bring suit within one year of the in-jury,187 unless the action is brought for fraud. 8 8 Genital herpes
will manifest itself within three weeks of the sexual contact.' 8 9 If
the plaintiff fails to bring an action within one year, he will be
barred from recovery. In Duke v. Housen,190 although the plain-
tiff was aware of the injury, she did not develop serious complica-
tions and bring suit until the statute had expired.1 91 The majority
of courts hold that the statute of limitations begins when there has
been notice of the invasion of a legal right of the plaintiff, even
though notice of its consequences does not materialize until
later.' 92 The statute of limitations may have harsh consequences
for the herpes plaintiff. However, statutes of limitations are arbi-
trary by their very nature and do not discriminate between the just
and unjust claim. 193 They are a reflection of the legislative policy
183. See PROSSER ON TORTS, supra note 36, at 433. Where the plaintiff's act is
also negligent, it will be weighed against the defendant's act.
184. See, e.g., Ridgeway v. North Star Terminal and Stevedoring Co., 378 P.2d
647 (Alaska 1963); Bartosh v. Banning, 251 Cal. App. 2d 378, 59 Cal. Rptr. 382 (Ct.
App. 1967); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 481 (1965).
185. Fraud requires that plaintiff be deceived. Plaintiff could not knowingly as-
sume and be deceived at the same time. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
186. But cf. State v. Lankford, 29 Del. (6 Boyce) 594, 102 A. 63 (1917); see also
text accompanying notes 32-36.
187. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340 (Deering's 1973).
188. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 343 (Deering's 1973).
189. See Oxman, supra note 3, at 1219.
190. 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1979), reh'g denied, 590 P.2d 1340 (Wyo. 1979).
191. Id. at 339.
192. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Wade, 514 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974); Christian v.
Daniell Battery Mfg. Co., Inc., 279 So. 2d 214 (La. Ct. App. 1973); Rankin v. Sowin-
ski, 119 N.J. Super 393, 291 A.2d 849 (1972); Matthieu v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co.,
269 N.C. 212, 152 S.E. 2d 336 (1967).
193. It may be argued that the legislatures should provide an extended statute of
[Vol. 20
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controlling the right to litigate. 194
CONCLUSION
Genital herpes is a growing social problem in the United States.
The effect on an individual's mental, social, and physical well-
being can be devastating. With the first lawsuits filed, genital
herpes has been transformed from merely a social problem to a
legal one as well.
A plaintiff who is wrongfully inflicted with genital herpes may
proceed with a cause of action in negligence, battery, or fraud.
The cause of action the plaintiff chooses will depend on the cir-
cumstances of each case. If the defendant acted unintentionally
but negligently, the plaintiff may sue in negligence. If the plaintiff
can establish the defendant acted intentionally he may pursue bat-
tery or fraud causes of action as well. Further, if the plaintiff can
prove the defendant acted with malice or intent, he may be able to
recover punitive damages.
Regardless of which avenue of redress the plaintiff may choose,
this Comment suggests, case law concerning contagious and vene-
real disease, misdemeanor statutes, public policy, and concern
over the spread of genital herpes clearly support recovery for the
wrongfully inflicted plaintiff.
The recognition of a legal duty to warn or take measures to
prevent transmission of genital herpes will allow, at a minimum,
the victim to recover monetary restitution, and should help deter
the spread of genital herpes as well as other sexually transmitted
diseases. The herpetic who is aware of legal liability will be more
likely to inform his potential sex partner of the risk of infection.
The purpose of the law of torts is to afford a compensation for
injuries sustained by one person as a result of the conduct of an-
other. 195 Unless recovery is allowed when there is a violation of a
right, the violations will continue with impunity and that which is
wrong will come to be regarded as something right.
196
William S. Donnell
limitation in the case of genital herpes suits, but until there is a legally recognized
right, to do so would be premature.
194. Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1945).
195. Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 COLUM. L.J. 238, 239 (1944).
196. DOOLEY, supra note 78 vol. 1, at 6.
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